HomeStuff2014 . 04Notes from Pacepa’s Disinformation

sketchbook.ercles.com - Sketchbook

Notes from Pacepa’s Disinformation

American Politics

The following are excerpts from Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism, Copyright © 2013 Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronald J. Rychlak. The keyword headings are emendations, provided to help find things faster.

Everyone should read that book.

More: “Disinformation: Inside the Russian-born Science of Influence”, a speech by Ronald Rychlak at the International Spy Museum.

Glasnost

You probably think Mikhail Gorbachev invented the concept of glasnost to describe his effort to lead the Soviet Union “out of its totalitarian state and to democracy, to freedom, to openness,” as he wrote. If so, you are not alone. All of the media and most of the “experts,” even in Western defense establishments, believe that too – as does the committee that awarded Gorbachev the Nobel Peace Prize. Even the venerable Encyclopedia Britannica defines glasnost as “Soviet policy of open discussion of political and social issues. It was instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s and began the democratization of the Soviet Union.” Merriam-Webster agrees. And the American Heritage Dictionary defines glasnost as “an official policy of the former Soviet government emphasizing candor with regard to discussion of social problems and shortcomings.”

But in fact, glasnost is an old Russian term for polishing the ruler’s image. Originally it meant, literally, publicizing, i.e., self-promotion. Since the sixteenth century’s Ivan the Terrible, the first ruler to become Tsar of All the Russias, all of that country’s leaders have used glasnost to promote themselves inside and outside the country.

In the mid-1930s – half a century before Gorbachev’s glasnost – the official Soviet encyclopedia defined glasnost as a spin on news released to the public: “Dostupnost obshchestvennomy obsuzhdeniyu, kontrolyu; publichnost,” meaning, “the quality of being made available for public discussion or manipulation.”

Thus, back in the days when I was still a member of the KGB community, glasnost was regarded as a tool of the black art of dezinformatsiya, and it was used to sanctify the country’s leader. For communists, only the leader counted. They used glasnost to sanctify their own leaders, and to induce hordes of Western leftists to fall for this scam.

2: The True Meaning of Glasnost, pp. 12-13

Glasnost, Putin

Glasnost is one of the most secret secrets of the Kremlin, and certainly one of the main reasons for keeping the KGB’s foreign intelligence archives hermetically sealed. The Cold War is over, but the Kremlin’s glasnost operations seem to be still en vogue. In August 1999, only days after Vladimir Putin was appointed Russia’s prime minister, the KGB’s dezinformatsiya machinery, capitalizing on the fact that he had spent many years in Germany, started portraying him as a Europeanized leader. (The fawning stories neglected to mention that he had been assigned to East Germany, a Soviet satellite at the time.) That same year, I went with my wife - an American writer and intelligence expert - to visit Leipzig and Dresden and tour the menacing buildings that had housed the Stasi (communist East Germany’s political police) headquarters where Putin had, in fact, spent his “Europeanizing” years. We learned that the local Soviet-German House of Friendship - headed by Putin for six years - had in fact been a KGB front, and that the undercover KGB officers running it had simply worked out of operational offices at the Leipzig and Dresden Stasi headquarters. We even sat in Putin’s chair, now a museum piece.

Those prison-like Stasi buildings had been cut off from even the normal and colorless East German life by Stasi guards brandishing machine guns and flanked by police dogs. Yet, even today, the Kremlin still reverentially implies that Putin’s experience in Germany was similar to that of Peter the Great, allowing him to absorb the best of European culture.

At the end of the 2001 summit meeting held in Slovenia, President George W. Bush said: “I looked the man [Putin] in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy.” Unfortunately, even President Bush was deceived by glasnost. Putin consolidated Russia into an intelligence dictatorship, not a democracy. By 2003, more than six thousand former officers of the KGB, who had framed millions as Zionist spies and shot them, were running Russia’s federal and local governments. Nearly half of all top governmental positions were held by former officers of the KGB. It was like democratizing Nazi Germany with Gestapo officers at its helm.

On February 12, 2004, Putin declared the demise of the Soviet Union a “national tragedy on an enormous scale.” Nevertheless, most of the world still sees him as a modern Peter the Great. That is the secret power of glasnost.

2: The True Meaning of Glasnost, pp. 13-14

Glasnost, Ceauşescu

“A man like me is born only once every five hundred years,” Ceauşescu would proclaim, over and over again, after 1972. That was his glasnost and, unfortunately, I was deeply involved in it.

For those who do not remember Ceauşescu, let me just say that he was more or less a Romanian version of the current Russian president, Vladimir Putin - an empty suit who morphed into his country’s president without having held any productive job, who knew nothing about how the real world worked, and who believed that lying to the world and killing off his critics were the magic wands that would keep him in power. Like Putin, Ceauşescu had supervised his country’s political police organization before becoming president. Behind the scenes, Ceauşescu, like Putin, used his intelligence machinery to override party politics as a means to power. Like Putin, he made an effort to detract attention away from his humble and colorless past by making his imperial dreams come true. And, of course, they both ascended the throne driven by the secret ambition to hang onto it for dear life.

After getting my marching orders from Ceauşescu in 1972, I was in Moscow a week later. KGB chairman Andropov greeted me by getting right to the point: “The only thing the West cares about is our leader.” He was famous for not wasting his breath on introductory chitchat. “The more they come to love him, the better they will like us,” he said. Making the imperialists believe our leaders admired them was the most efficacious glasnost tactic for now. It was as simple as that, and it worked, he said. The KGB had already achieved great success in making certain elements in the West admire - even love - “the Comrade” (meaning first Stalin, then Khrushchev).

Andropov’s dark, cavernous office breathed secrecy from every inch of its thick walls, just as his new glasnost did. The velvet window draperies were closed, and the only light came from the flickering flames of a fire inside the fireplace. The chairman’s ascetic fingers felt cold and moist when he shook my hand. He took a seat on the side of the table facing the warmth of the fireplace, not at the head, as Soviet bureaucratic protocol required. His kidney illness had worsened and he needed to keep warm, so as to avoid having to go to the bathroom too often during a meeting.

“Let the gullible fools believe you want to perfume your communism with a dab of Western democracy, and they will clothe you in gold,” Andropov declared. The creation of the image of the “new Ceauşescu” should be planted like opium seeds - patiently but tenaciously, one by one by one. We should water our seeds day after day until they bear fruit. We should promise that more openness and Westernization will be forthcoming, if only the West helps our new “moderate” Ceauşescu to defeat his “hardline” opponents at home.

Some two hours later, the KGB chairman concluded our meeting as abruptly as he had started it: “I’ll lay you a million to one that the West will swallow it.”

When I left the Lubyanka (KGB headquarters), I took with me a devious glasnost plan for image reconstruction. Ceauşescu followed it to the letter. He rebaptized the Grand National Assembly, Romania’s version of the Supreme Soviet, as “Parliament,” added a few religious leaders to it, and declared it the country’s governing body. Of course, it remained the same rubber-stamp organization Romania had had before. Next, Ceauşescu publicy called for the Communist Party to reduce its influence on the administration and the economy of the country. That was another inspired glasnost trick. Then Ceauşescu staged a simulated economic decentralization, instituted dual candidates for local elections, and announced a campaign against corruption and drunkenness.

That done, Ceauşescu created the national position of “president,” endowed it with broad governing powers, and awarded himself the post.

To impress the religious, Ceauşescu even marched behind a metropolitan of the church and a clutch of priests at his father’s funeral. Lastly, he developed a specialty of telling anti-Soviet jokes.

It worked like a charm. Bucharest became an East European mecca, filed to the brim with Western journalists and politicians eager to get a closer look at the man who had dared to change communism for the better. A celebrity was born.

Western businessmen rushed to Bucharest, hoping to get in on the ground floor for a slice of the new Romania. Of course, most of them had been lured there by my undercover DIE (Romania’s foreign intelligence service) operatives, who went to great lengths to pamper them during their stay. Gradually, my undercover officers became expert at “rewarding” the “friendly” visitors by setting up interviews for them with Ceauşescu, inviting them to lavish banquets held in Romania’s picturesque monasteries, carousing with them at all-night parties and finding them compliant girlfriends. Or even by involving them in profitable businesses.

Today, no one remembers that Ceauşescu was once Washington’s fair-haired boy. Contemporary political memory seems to be increasingly afflicted with a kind of convenient Alzheimer’s disease. But two American presidents went to Bucharest to pay Ceauşescu tribute, when none had ever gone there before. To cap it all off, my lord and master began a royal junket around the free world to sell his image - the United States, Japan, France, Italy, the Vatican, Finland, West Germany, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, and the Philippines, to mention only a few of his hosts.

On all of these trips, Ceauşescu kept me at his right hand. He now religiously believed that glasnost, not Marxist ideology, was the magic wand that would make his ambitions a reality.

In 1978, I accompanied Ceauşescu on his fourth and most triumphant trip to Washington, and I was next to him when he took a historic drive throughout London with Queen Elizabeth in the British royal coach. Few now remember it, but a steady stream of front-page articles on Romania appeared in the United States, Great Britain, and Western Europe at that time, extolling Ceauşescu’s new “Westernized Communism.” The tyrant was portrayed as a new breed of communist ruler, one the West could do business with. Romania seemed a normal country - a place where people could criticize their government, visit monasteries, listen to Western symphonies, read foreign books and even point to their stylish first lady.

We were also quite successful at filling Western media airwaves with the new image of Ceauşescu. The truth is, the Western media are quite easily manipulated, for they often craft their stories from press releases and tend, on the whole, to be indiscriminate about the nature and reliability of their sources. Our information fit quite well with the general mood of Western acceptance of Ceauşescu as a Westernized communist. In the West, his position generally seemed a plausible and historic breach in the Iron Curtain, and almost no one stepped up to check the facts and contradict us.

2: The True Meaning of Glasnost, pp. 14-17

Glasnost, Andropov

In 1982, Yuri Andropov, the father of the modern Soviet dezinformatsiya era, became ruler of the Soviet Union itself, and glasnost became a Soviet foreign policy as well. Once settled in the Kremlin, the former KGB chairman hastened to introduce himself to the West as a “moderate” communist and a sensitive, warm, Western-oriented man, who allegedly enjoyed an occasional drink of Scotch, liked to read English novels, and loved listening to Beethoven and American jazz. In reality, Andropov did not drink at all, for he was already terminally ill from a kidney disorder. The rest of the portrayal was equally false – as I well know, having been quite well acquainted with Andropov. As for “moderate,” any head of the KGB necessarily had hands drenched in blood.

In the brief span left to him, the cynical Andropov focused on projecting his new image and promoting his protégé, a vigorous and callous young professional communist who was busy honing the same moderate image for himself — Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev introduced himself to the West exactly as Andropov had: a cultured sophisticate and aficionado of Western opera and jazz. The Kremlin has always known that this picture holds particular charm for the gullible West.

Gorbachev is thought to have been recruited by the KGB in the early 1950s while studying law at Moscow State University, where he spied on his foreign classmates. As long as the KGB archives remain sealed, we will not be able to learn more details about those years of Gorbachev’s life. But we do now know that after graduating from the university, Gorbachev interned at the Lubyanka, the state security headquarters, where he came under Andropov’s influence. Both had begun their careers in Stavropol. Andropov got Gorbachev appointed to the Soviet Politburo, and one Gorbachev biographer even describes him as Andropov’s “crown prince.”

Meanwhile, the West’s admiration for Ceauşescu’s glasnost took on such a life of its own that it could not be stopped. In a letter dated 27 January 1983, written to Ceauşescu on his birthday, President Richard Nixon, whom I had already briefed about Ceauşescu’s glasnost after I defected to the United States, gushed:

Ever since we first met and talked in 1967, I have watched you grow in stature as a statesman. Your vigor, your single-mindedness, your acute intelligence – and especially your ability to act skillfully on both domestic and international fronts – place you in the first rank of world leaders . . . At 65 most people are ready to retire, but for many of the greatest leaders the most productive and satisfying years are still ahead. I am certain that your best moments will come in your second decade as President as you continue to follow the bold, independent course you have set for your people.

The late Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, for whose staunch anti-communism I have high regard, told me in 1988 that Ceauşescu “may be crazy with his own people, but believe me, General, he is the one who’ll break up the Soviet bloc.” A few months later, however, Ceauşescu was executed by his own people at the end of a trial in which the accusations came almost word-for-word out of my book, Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae & Elena Ceauşescu Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption.

By that time, however, Washington and the rest of the West had shifted their affections. Now it was the man in the Kremlin, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was seen as the nascent democrat and touted as a political visionary. Once again, the Western media appeared to swallow their own hype. Gorbachev’s rhetoric about combining “communist values” with “Western democracy introduced from the top” and “a centralized free-market economy” enthralled the world. Piles of Gorbachev’s Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World took the place of Ceauşescu’s memoirs in bookstore windows.

So much for institutional memory.

2: The True Meaning of Glasnost, pp. 17-18

Framing

In KGB jargon, changing people’s pasts was called “framing,” and it was a highly classified disinformation specialty. Because of those KGB framings, there are few things more difficult for Russian and Western historians today than to predict Russia’s past.

6: Kremlin Framings, p. 44

Sulners

Even more interesting is the Sulners’ description of how they operated. Hanna’s father had been a pioneer in handwriting analysis and an authority on questionable documents. Hanna studied criminology and took over her father’s business after his death, later to be joined by Lázlo, who became her husband. Hanna’s father had invented a device that took words and phrases from manuscripts and put them together as desired to form a new manuscript, and Lázlo developed this technique to such perfection that even experts could not detect the forgery.

The Sulners and their device came to the attention of the Hungarian secret police in 1948, when they showed Lázlo a list of cabinet members Mindszenty was allegedly going to appoint after the overthrow of the government. Lázlo immediately dubbed it a forgery and produced a better list, which was later amended and used as evidence at the trial.

Cardinal Mindszenty

On January 4, 1949, Lázlo was asked to produce a confession by Mindszenty in accordance with the typewritten draft the police provided. The Sulners were also asked to forge other documents, signatures, and marginal notations for the case. When they did not work quickly enough for the police, they and their entire apparatus were moved to police headquarters. A steady flow of documents resulted, some of which were produced by ignorant, inexperienced police officers and resulted in what Mindszenty described as “outlandish form and spelling, such as my confession.” The Soviet security police would have immediately learned from their Hungarian counterpart about the Sulners’ virtually foolproof technique for fabricating documents. As a result, it is clear why disinformation and framing experts in any of the Soviet block intelligence services were insatiable in their efforts to collect as many original documents as possible on a target.

11: Cardinal Mindszenty, p. 87

Liberation Theology

In the 1950s and 1960s, most Latin Americans were poor, religious peasants who had accepted the status quo, and Khrushchev was confident they could be converted to communism through the judicious manipulation of religion. In 1968, the KGB was able to maneuver a group of South American bishops into holding a conference in Medellin, Colombia. At the KGB’s request, my DIE provided logistical assistance to the organizers. The official task of the conference was to help eliminate poverty in Latin America. Its undeclared goal was to legitimize a KGB-created religious movement dubbed “liberation theology,” the secret task of which was to incite Latin America’s poor to rebel against the "institutionalized violence of poverty" generated by the United States.

The KGB had a penchant for “liberation” movements. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the National Liberation Army of Columbia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army of Bolivia were just a few of the “liberation” movements born at the KGB. The Medellin Conference did indeed endorse liberation theology, and the delegates recommended it to the World Council of Churches (WCC) for official approval. The WCC, headquartered in Geneva and representing the Russian Orthodox Church and other smaller denominations throughout more than 120 countries, had already come under the control of Soviet foreign intelligence. It remains politically under the control of today’s Kremlin, through the many Orthodox priests who are prominent in the WCC and are at the same time Russian intelligence agents. Dissident Russian priest Gleb Yakunin, who was a member of the Russian Duma from 1990 to 1995, and was briefly given official access to KGB archives, released a great deal of information in samizdat reports identifying the Orthodox priests who were agents and describing their influence on WCC matters. For example, in 1983 the KGB dispatched forty-seven agents to attend the WCC General Assembly in Vancouver, and the following year the KGB took credit for using its agents on the WCC selection committee to arrange for the right man to be elected WCC general secretary.

World Council of Churches general secretary, Eugene Carson Blake — a former president of the National Council of Churches in the United States — endorsed liberation theology and made it part of the WCC agenda. In March 1970 and 1971, the first South American Catholic congresses devoted to liberation theology took place in Bogota.

In 1985, the KGB-managed World Council of Churches elected its first general secretary who was an avowed Marxist: Emilio Castro. He had been exiled from Uruguay because of his political extremism, but he managed the WCC until 1992. Castro strongly promoted the KGB-created liberation theology, which is today putting down strong roots in Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In those countries, the peasants have supported the efforts of Marxist dictators Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Manuel Zelaya (now exiled to Costa Rica), and Daniel Ortega to transform their countries into KGB-style police dictatorships. In September 2008, Venezuela and Bolivia booted out the U.S. ambassadors during the same week and called for Russian military protection.

15: Liberation Theology, pp. 106-108

Black Liberation Theology

A few years ago a black version of liberation theology began growing in a few radical-leftist black churches in the United States. Black liberation theologians James Cone, Cornel West, and Dwight Hopkins have explicitly stated their preference for Marxism because Marxist thought is predicated on a system of oppressor class (whites) versus victim class (blacks), and it sees just one solution: the destruction of the enemy. James Cone explained:

Black theology will accept only the love of God which participates in the destruction of the white enemy. What we need is the divine love as expressed in Black Power, which is the power of black people to destroy their oppressors here and now by any means at their disposal. Unless God is participating in this holy activity, we must reject his love.

15: Liberation Theology, p. 108

20140419-0203-01

Axe

Sketchbook Story

The Cross

American Politics

Music

The Free Market

Tactics

Evening Weird

Scrapbook

Digital Life

The Wasteland

Play

All Stuff

Social Stuff

Axe on Twitter

Axe on Google+

Axe on YouTube

Meta Stuff

Copyright © 2012 - 2016 sketchbook.ercles.com

All rights reserved